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THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, FOURTH
AMENDMENT, AND THE THIRD-PARTY
DOCTRINE: TWO TAKEAWAYS FROM THE




As technology moves into previously uncharted territory, the law must
follow closely behind, either by adapting prior decisions to fit the new terrain
or establishing new precedent. Virtual currencies, such as Bitcoin, are cer-
tainly no exception and present courts with the novel issue of whether users
have a reasonable expectation of privacy regarding their Bitcoin transactions
worthy of Fourth Amendment protection. In United States v. Gratkowski, the
Fifth Circuit declined to extend that protection to information stored on the
publicly available Bitcoin blockchain, as well as personal information kept
by Bitcoin exchanges.1 Largely basing its decision on the third-party doc-
trine, the court reasoned that users voluntarily turn over personal information
to create accounts on a Bitcoin exchange and sending Bitcoins using such
exchanges requires an “affirmative act” to execute the transaction, which is
recorded on a public ledger.2 As the first appellate court to weigh in on the
issue, the Fifth Circuit’s decision helps both Bitcoin users and law enforce-
ment navigate this relatively new territory of virtual currencies and acts as a
warning to users who seek anonymity by using Bitcoin for illicit
transactions.3
II. BACKGROUND
A. Bitcoin, Blockchain, and Bitcoin Exchanges
Before seeing how courts analyze novel issues regarding Bitcoin, it is
important to first have a general understanding of what Bitcoin is and how it
is used. Although frequently discussed as a potentially worthwhile invest-
ment because of its volatility in price,4 the technology behind how Bitcoin
* Daniel Penn is a 2022 Candidate for Juris Doctor at the SMU Dedman School
of Law. He received a Bachelor of Science in Psychology from Texas Christian
University.
1. United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307, 312–13 (5th Cir. 2020).
2. Id. at 311–13.
3. See id. at 311–12.
4. See Ben Winck, Bitcoin Rallies 4% to Surpass $14,000 as Election Volatility
Fuels Cryptocurrency Surge, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 4, 2020, 1:36 PM), https://
markets.businessinsider.com/currencies/news/bitcoin-price-hiits-14000-us-
election-volatility-btc-cryptocurrency-market-2020-11-1029766585.
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transactions take place is what brings Gratkowski’s case to the Fifth Circuit.5
According to its website, Bitcoin is “the first decentralized peer-to-peer pay-
ment network that is powered by its users with no central authority or mid-
dlemen.”6 Although lacking any “physical properties (like gold and silver)”
or backing by a central government, Bitcoin instead derives its value through
trust by people willing to accept Bitcoins in exchange for goods or services.7
The transparent-by-design nature of how Bitcoins function as a currency
helps foster that trust because every transaction is permanently recorded on a
public ledger known as the “blockchain.”8 Additionally, because anyone can
access the Bitcoin source code and the blockchain cannot be modified, every
aspect of how Bitcoin works can be verified and all transactions can be
double-checked.9 When a transaction occurs, each user’s public Bitcoin ad-
dress, as well as the amount of Bitcoin, is added to the blockchain to docu-
ment the transfer.10 A public Bitcoin address is a random string of twenty-six
numbers and letters that designates either the sender or recipient of a transac-
tion,11 acting similarly to an email address without any indication as to who
actually owns the account.12 A private key, which should only be known by
the Bitcoin address owner, is tied to each address and allows owners to spend
the Bitcoins registered to that address by verifying the transaction.13
Many users opt to use third-party Bitcoin exchange websites to buy,
sell, and transfer Bitcoin instead of downloading the necessary software to
interact with the blockchain themselves.14 Operating much like stock ex-
changes for buying ownership in publicly traded companies, these websites
match those looking to buy with those willing to sell.15 Coinbase, the ex-
change website discussed in the case, is a self-described “one stop shop” that
also allows users to “store” their Bitcoins in virtual wallets through the web-
5. See Gratkowski, 964 F.3d at 309.
6. Frequently Asked Questions, BITCOIN, https://bitcoin.org/en/faq#general (last




10. David Floyd, How Bitcoin Works, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.
com/news/how-bitcoin-works/ (last updated June 30, 2020).
11. Bitcoin Addresses Explained, TOKENS24 (Nov. 14, 2017), https://www.tokens
24.com/cryptopedia/basics/bitcoin-addresses-explained.
12. Floyd, supra note 10.
13. Id.
14. Jake Frankenfield, Bitcoin Exchange, INVESTOPEDIA, https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/b/bitcoin-exchange.asp (last updated July 13,
2020).
15. Id.
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site in addition to serving as an exchange.16 As part of creating an account,
Coinbase requires users to verify their identity by uploading either a driver’s
license or state-issued ID card.17 Once the user’s identity is confirmed, they
are free to buy, sell, and transfer Bitcoin with other users, including as pay-
ment on websites that accept it.18
B. Facts Leading to Gratkowski’s Case
As part of an investigation into a child-pornography website in 2016,
federal agents determined that users were paying for downloadable material
from the website with Bitcoin.19 Those agents, with the assistance of an
outside service, then determined which Bitcoin addresses were linked to the
website under investigation by analyzing the publicly-available Bitcoin
blockchain.20 To uncover more information about the website’s users, agents
then served a grand jury subpoena on Coinbase for information about any
customers who had sent Bitcoin to the website’s addresses.21 Coinbase’s re-
sponse to the subpoena indicated that Gratkowski had transacted with the
website, and the agents used this connection as probable cause to obtain a
warrant to search his home.22
The execution of that search warrant led to Gratkowski’s arrest after
agents discovered a hard drive with almost 200 illicit images inside of his
home.23 During a subsequent interview with agents, Gratkowski admitted
that he had visited the site in question, in addition to downloading files from
multiple sites.24 After being charged on a two-count indictment, Gratkowski
quickly moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the government
violated the Fourth Amendment by using a subpoena to obtain his informa-
tion instead of a warrant.25 However, the district court denied the motion.26
Although the district court later vacated the initial denial sua sponte, it deter-
16. What is Coinbase?, COINBASE, https://help.coinbase.com/en/coinbase/getting-
started/general-crypto-education/what-is-coinbase (last visited June 9, 2021).
17. Identity Document Verification, COINBASE, https://help.coinbase.com/en/
coinbase/getting-started/verify-my-account/id-doc-verification (last visited
June 9, 2021).
18. How to Send and Receive Cryptocurrency, COINBASE, https://
help.coinbase.com/en/coinbase/trading-and-funding/cryptocurrency-trading-
pairs/how-to-send-and-receive-cryptocurrency.html (last visited June 9, 2021).








128 SMU Science and Technology Law Review [Vol. XXIV
mined that—even if Gratkowski had a reasonable expectation of privacy—
the evidence was still admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule.27 Following the court’s decision not to suppress the evidence,
Gratkowski pled guilty to both counts, reserving the right to appeal the
Fourth Amendment issue as part of his plea agreement.28
III. THE APPEAL
In hearing this appeal, the Fifth Circuit had to determine whether
Bitcoin users have a Fourth Amendment privacy interest in either the infor-
mation of their Bitcoin transactions stored on the Bitcoin blockchain or per-
sonal information provided to by the users Bitcoin exchanges like
Coinbase.29 In holding that there was no reasonable expectation of privacy,
the court correctly reasoned that the public nature of the Bitcoin blockchain
ledger combined with the voluntary disclosure of information to Bitcoin ex-
changes by the users negated the need for agents to obtain a warrant.30 Spe-
cifically, the Fifth Circuit was not willing to adopt Gratkowski’s argument
that the Bitcoin blockchain and personal information collected by Coinbase
deserved the same protection of cell phone location information,31 which is
protected by the Fourth Amendment.32
A. The Fifth Circuit Looks to Third-Party Doctrine Precedent for
Guidance
Unpersuaded by Gratkowski’s comparisons of Bitcoins to cell phone
location records, the Fifth Circuit instead focused on why the Supreme Court
considered location records worthy of protection, despite seeming to fit
squarely within the third-party doctrine.33 Typically, people forfeit any legiti-
mate expectation of privacy in information “voluntarily turn[ed] over to third
parties.”34 The Supreme Court in United States v. Miller applied this third-
party doctrine to information contained in bank records because those
records revealed information that customers had turned over to the banks
voluntarily and were considered “negotiable instruments” rather than docu-
ments presumed to be confidential.35
26. Id. at 11.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d at 310.
30. See id. at 311–12.
31. Id. at 312.
32. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2223 (2018).
33. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d at 311.
34. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979).
35. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442 (1976).
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Similarly, telephone call logs also fall within the third-party doctrine
exception to the Fourth Amendment because placing a call requires the user
to voluntarily convey the intended recipient by dialing the appropriate num-
bers, according to the Supreme Court in Smith v. Maryland.36 But both
Miller37 and Smith38 were decided decades before cell phones became popu-
lar and, thus, the Supreme Court had to determine if the technological ad-
vances in both the type of data collected and the manner in which it was
acquired differed from call logs such that it was still obtainable without a
warrant.39 The Fifth Circuit, therefore, appropriately considered the rationale
in Carpenter as guidance on whether the third-party doctrine was appropriate
for information seemingly similar to bank records or if the nature of Bitcoin
transactions is sufficiently distinguishable.40
In Carpenter, the Supreme Court weighed both the “nature of the partic-
ular documents sought” and the “voluntary exposure” in considering whether
the government obtaining 127 days’ worth of timestamped GPS data from a
third-party phone company constituted a Fourth Amendment search, requir-
ing a warrant.41 Compared to phone call logs, the Court considered the nature
of cell phone location information to be far more invasive because it “pro-
vides an intimate window into a person’s life,” while also being far easier,
cheaper, and more efficient than “traditional investigative tools.”42 Addition-
ally, the cell phone location information differs from phone calls because the
user is not voluntarily offering their location to the provider by carrying a
cell phone, but instead the information is more passively collected than ac-
tively dialing specific phone numbers.43 As a result, the Supreme Court held
that, even though the cell phone location information came from a third
party, the intimate nature of the information and lack of an affirmative act by
the user kept it under the protection of the Fourth Amendment; therefore, a
warrant was necessary to obtain the information.44
B. The Court’s Rationale for Not Extending Protection to Bitcoin
Transactions
Weighing the same factors considered in Carpenter, the Fifth Circuit
first considered whether Gratkowski had a reasonable expectation of privacy
36. Smith, 442 U.S. at 742.
37. Miller, 425 U.S. 435.
38. Smith, 442 U.S. 735.
39. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2216–17 (2018).
40. See United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307, 311–12 (5th Cir. 2020).
41. Carpenter, 138 S. Ct. at 2219–20.
42. Id. at 2217–18.
43. Id. at 2220.
44. Id.
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in his information on the Bitcoin blockchain.45 As previously described,
every Bitcoin transaction is permanently documented on the blockchain,
which is accessible to anyone wanting to view it.46 Specifically, the informa-
tion stored on the public blockchain only consists of both parties’ Bitcoin
addresses and the amount of Bitcoin transferred.47 The court considered the
nature of this information to be limited and does not constitute “a pervasive
[or] insistent part of daily life.”48 Additionally, the court noted that transfer-
ring Bitcoin “requires an affirmative act by the Bitcoin address holder.”49
Consequently, it determined that Gratkowski did not have a reasonable pri-
vacy interest in the information stored on the public Bitcoin blockchain.50
Turning next to Gratkowski’s privacy interest in his Bitcoin transactions
on Coinbase, the court again considers the nature of the information main-
tained in records by Coinbase and whether he voluntarily turned over that
information.51 Emphasizing that Coinbase is a financial institution and is reg-
ulated through the Bank Secrecy Act just like traditional banks, the court
quickly concluded that the Coinbase records are more closely aligned with
the bank records at issue in Miller than cell phone location information,52
despite Gratkowski’s efforts to convince them otherwise.53 Without privacy
interests in either his information on the blockchain or on Coinbase, the Fifth
Circuit affirmed the trial court’s denial of his motion to suppress and became
the first appellate court to decide that Bitcoin transactions carried out through
a third-party exchange are not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection.54
IV. ANALYSIS AND PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
FIFTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
In declining to extend Fourth Amendment protection to information
stored on the blockchain and on exchange websites, the court correctly deter-
mined that, although the technology required for Bitcoin transactions is far
more complicated than traditional currencies, third-party exchange websites
are very similar to traditional banks from the user’s perspective.55 Both plat-
forms provide users a place to keep their money, transfer it to other accounts,
45. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d at 311–12.
46. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
47. Id.





53. Brief of Appellee, supra note 23, at 17–18.
54. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d at 313.
55. See generally id. at 312–13.
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and exchange it for other forms of currency.56 As discussed by the court,
these similarities are why Coinbase is a regulated financial institution
through the Bank Secrecy Act and keeps records of its customers’ identi-
ties.57 Thus, the lure of Bitcoin as a potentially-anonymous form of payment
is unobtainable when using an intermediary like Coinbase because, not only
are Bitcoin transactions inherently transparent by design,58 but they also
cleanly fall within the third-party doctrine, allowing for the government to
obtain customer information in bank records with a grand jury subpoena
rather than a warrant.
A. Why Gratkowski’s Fourth Amendment Argument Fails
In his appeal, Gratkowski attempted to argue that the analysis of the
Bitcoin blockchain and subpoena served on Coinbase constituted searches
requiring warrants and that the government’s failure to obtain such warrants
violated his Fourth Amendment right against unlawful search and seizure.59
To support his argument, Gratkowski heavily relied on the Supreme Court’s
decision in Carpenter affording Fourth Amendment protection to cell phone
location records,60 in addition to the district court vacating the initial denial
because the Coinbase records “may fall within the rule announced in
Carpenter.”61
Analogizing the Supreme Court’s rationale in Carpenter, Gratkowski
unsuccessfully argued that the Bitcoin blockchain’s inherently public nature
did not automatically preclude protection because “[a] person does not sur-
render all Fourth Amendment protection by venturing into the public
sphere.”62 However, using Bitcoin as a form of payment goes well beyond
merely “venturing into the public sphere.”63 By design, all Bitcoin transac-
tions permanently become part of the blockchain in order to ensure trans-
parency between parties and are viewable by any person that accesses the
blockchain.64 Although privacy concerns were clearly considered when de-
termining what information would be recorded on the blockchain,65 those
concerns were addressed by only recording the Bitcoin addresses of both
56. What Is Coinbase?, supra note 16.
57. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d at 312.
58. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
59. Brief of Appellee, supra note 23, at 12.
60. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206, 2272 (2018).
61. Brief of Appellee, supra note 23, at 18–19.
62. Id. at 17.
63. See id.
64. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
65. Satoshi Nakamoto, Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System, BITCOIN,
https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf (last visited July 5, 2021).
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parties and the amount.66 On the surface, this would appear to support a find-
ing that users have a reasonable expectation of privacy. Instead, however, the
limited information publicly recorded almost completely solidifies the oppo-
site conclusion because the lack of identifiable information heavily suggests
that users would not have a privacy interest.67
Because the ledger does not directly contain identifying information,68
Gratkowski notes that the government had to recruit a third party, who used
“powerful and sophisticated software” to determine clusters of addresses re-
lated to the website.69 That software, he argued, is similar to “the sense-
enhancing technology in Kyllo that was ‘not in general public use.’”70 Al-
though not addressed by the court in deciding this case, the Supreme Court
held that the use of thermal imager to detect heat signatures from inside the
defendant’s home constituted a Fourth Amendment search because the gov-
ernment cannot capitalize on new sense-enhancing technology to gain the
ability to see into a person’s home without a warrant.71
This argument is not persuasive for two reasons. First, the thermal
imager used in Kyllo allowed government agents to effectively “see” through
walls that would otherwise completely prevent observation by detecting heat
coming from individuals on the inside.72 Without the thermal imager, govern-
ment agents would not be able to see what was behind the homeowner’s
wall.73 The Bitcoin blockchain, however, is publicly available for any user to
analyze and verify.74 The software used to detect address clusters does not
give those using it the ability see previously-hidden information.75 Instead, it
simply allows the user to more efficiently analyze the publicly available
blockchain.76 Second, even if the court did consider the software to be sense-
enhancing like the thermal imagers, the holding in Kyllo is only applicable
when the government is exploring within the individual’s home.77 The
Bitcoin blockchain, on the other hand, is not located within Gratkowski’s
66. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
67. United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307, 311–12 (5th Cir. 2020).
68. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
69. Brief of Appellee, supra note 23, at 18.
70. Id.
71. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35 (2001).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
75. Brief of Appellee, supra note 23, at 27–28.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 28–29.
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home but rather on the peer-to-peer network that links computers from all
around the world.78
B. Future Implications of the Fifth Circuit’s Decision
Just as Bitcoin was the preferred payment method on the website79 dis-
cussed in the Gratkowski case, Bitcoin has a long-standing reputation as an
ideal currency for illicit transactions.80 This reputation, in part, is likely due
to its apparent ability to provide anonymity to users attempting to shield their
identity by hiding behind their Bitcoin addresses.81 The Fifth Circuit’s deci-
sion, however, appears to cut against that apparent anonymity by declining to
afford Fourth Amendment protection to Bitcoin wallets and information
stored on the Bitcoin blockchain.82 Could this decision, then, potentially help
Bitcoin shake its connection with illegal activity and bolster confidence as a
legitimate currency?
According to the New York Times, only one percent of all Bitcoin trans-
actions actually involve illicit activity.83 Although the amount of Bitcoin
used for illegal activity is probably slightly higher due to people using legiti-
mate means of purchasing Bitcoins in attempts to circumvent laws of their
respective countries and, thus, making the percentage harder to accurately
quantify,84 the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Gratkowksi could nevertheless help
deter would-be criminals in the United States from using the virtual currency
to carry out these illicit transactions.85 Federal agents would no longer need
to obtain a warrant—but instead just a grand jury subpoena—to uncloak their
hidden identities due to the ID-verification requirement on sites such as
Coinbase.86 Combined with efforts to shut down dark net trading websites,87
Bitcoin should soon be able to finally transition from its dark history with
online crime to a new, established way to pay for services as more and more
people begin to trust the currency, which is, after all, where Bitcoin’s value
itself is derived.88
78. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
79. United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307, 311–12 (5th Cir. 2020).
80. Nathaniel Popper, Bitcoin Has Lost Steam. But Criminals Still Love It., N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/technology/bit
coin-black-market.html.
81. Id.
82. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d at 310.
83. Popper, supra note 80.
84. Id.
85. Identity Document Verification, supra note 17.
86. Id.
87. Popper, supra note 80.
88. Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
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V. CONCLUSION
Being the first circuit decision regarding Bitcoin and the Fourth Amend-
ment, there is always the possibility that another circuit might decide differ-
ently, or the Supreme Court could reverse the ruling. Although, given the
logical analysis used by the Fifth Circuit and the inherently public nature of
Bitcoin’s blockchain, other circuits may instead opt to use this case as a
guide should a similar issue arise. As a result, this decision should serve as a
warning to individuals under the impression that using Bitcoin protects your
identity when making illicit transactions. The lack of identifying information
recorded on the blockchain might afford some privacy from the average per-
son uncovering the parties involved in a transaction, but there is no reasona-
ble expectation of privacy worthy of Fourth Amendment protection to that
record or to the information stored by Coinbase.
The lack of Fourth Amendment protection could potentially serve as a
deterrent for using Bitcoin and blockchain technology as a method of con-
ducting illegal businesses, thus eliminating the negative stigma long-since
associated with the technology.89 Additionally, companies that were previ-
ously on the fence about the technology because of that stigma could be more
receptive to adopting Bitcoin and blockchain into their business because the
court has shown that it is helping to regulate the new technology by cracking
down illicit uses. Therefore, the Fifth Circuit’s decision could help propel
Bitcoin’s trajectory forward as an accepted currency by correctly deciding
that Gratkowski was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection when us-
ing Bitcoin for illicit activity.90
89. Popper, supra note 80.
90. United States v. Gratkowski, 964 F.3d 307, 310 (5th Cir. 2020).
